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Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information - ScienceDirect
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JavaScript is disabled on your browser. Please enable JavaScript to use all the features on this page., January 2012, Pages 222-234aThe School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 69978, IsraelbHEC Paris, Economics and Decision Sciences Department, 78351 Jouy en Josas, FranceShow moreAbstractThis paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.Highlights? We study extensive form games with symmetric public information. ? We prove that communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by cheap-talk. ? The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.JEL classificationC73KeywordsCheap-talk; Communication equilibrium; Normal-form correlated equilibrium; Distributed computationCheck if you have access through your login credentials or your institution.ororRecommended articlesCiting articles (0)MR: Matches for: MR=3103241
MathSciNet bibliographic data
(90C25 90C34)
Campi, M. C.; Carè, A. Random convex programs with $L_1$-regularization: sparsity and generalization.
SIAM J. Control Optim.
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